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Fundamentals may determine the range of real exchange rate fluctuation, through signals 
of misalignment, even if they are not a major influence on the level within that range.  
This can explain the puzzle that more open economies experience lower real exchange 
rate volatility. Adjustment of domestic prices to nominal exchange rate movements can 
account for only a small proportion of this effect. Sustainability analysis focuses on the 
ratio of the current account to GDP (rather than to total trade flows) as a misalignment 
signal, which implies narrower bounds for real exchange rates in more open economies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The well-known result of Meese and Rogoff (1983) that exchange rate models perform 
poorly out of sample has stood the test of time (Cheung et al., 2005; McCracken and 
Sapp, 2005). The lack of correlation of exchange rates with observed fundamentals is 
consistent with the asset-price interpretation of exchange rates, although there is some 
evidence of correlation with future fundamentals, as present-value models with rational 
expectations would suggest (Engel and West, 2005).  Here it is argued that, although the 
fundamentals may do little to determine exchange rates within their observed range of 
fluctuation, they are probably important in setting the width of that range – a notion that 
clearly has much in common with non-linear models of mean-reversion.  It will be shown 
that this can explain the empirically observed phenomenon that more open economies 
have less volatile real exchange rates, which is otherwise a puzzle, because the current 
account sustainability condition implies tighter boundaries on exchange rate fluctuation 
in economies that are less open to international trade. 
The negative correlation between real exchange rate volatility and openness has 
been demonstrated both for bilateral rates (Devereux and Lane, 2003) and for effective 
rates (Hau, 2002).   A further phenomenon, which we do not investigate here, is that less 
developed economies experience greater real exchange rate volatility (Hausmann et al., 
2004).  An obvious hypothesis is that, if prices in more open economies adjust more to 
exchange rate movements, then more open economies will experience less real exchange 
rate volatility for the same nominal exchange rate volatility.  Hence, for the same 
volatility of nominal shocks, more open economies will experience less real exchange 
rate volatility (Hau, 2002).  It is shown here that this effect, although statistically   2
significant, is too small to explain the phenomenon.  The cross-country pattern of 
nominal exchange rate volatility is virtually identical to that for real exchange rate 
volatility, no doubt because widespread pricing-to-market behaviour in advanced 
economies, combined with the weight of non-tradeables in the consumer price index, 
strongly attenuates any effect of exchange rate movements on the price level.  The cross-
country pattern of nominal exchange rate volatility does not match the cross-country 
pattern of nominal shocks. While nominal variables, such as monetary growth or relative 
inflation rates, are no less volatile in more open economies, the nominal exchange rate is 
much less volatile.  This reflects the fact that the nominal exchange rate is the price of an 
asset traded in deep and liquid markets, so that its short-term movements have little to do 
with shocks to fundamentals. 
 
2. A  POSSIBLE  EXPLANATION 
An alternative explanation of the real exchange rate volatility puzzle is as follows.  It is 
well known that real exchange rates exhibit near-random walk behaviour, but possibly 
only within certain bounds, outside which there is significant mean-reversion.  This idea 
has been tested through various non-linear models, with some empirical support. Because 
real exchange rates spend the vast majority of their time within the random-walk range, 
empirically observed real exchange rate volatility will reflect the width of that range.  If 
real exchange rates follow a bounded random walk, but the bounds are wider for less 
open economies, then less open economies will in practice experience greater real 
exchange rate volatility.   3
Theoretical models that attempt to account for this behaviour have postulated an 
exchange market populated by “fundamentalists” and “chartists” (Frankel and Froot, 
1986a, 1986b; Kubelec, 2004).  Fundamentalists believe in reversion towards an 
equilibrium, but may differ amongst themselves in their beliefs about the equilibrium 
level of the real exchange rate (Jeanne and Rose, 2002).  Chartists believe that the real 
exchange rate is a non-stationary variable, and thus ignore potential signals of 
disequilibrium such as current account deficits.  In these models there is a close 
relationship between the range over which the real exchange rate is likely to vary and the 
uncertainty amongst fundamentalists about the true equilibrium.  Once almost all 
fundamentalists are convinced that an exchange rate is overvalued, for example, then the 
resulting selling pressure is likely to push the rate down.  Consequently the upper bound 
to the exchange rate will reflect what fundamentalists regard as a clear signal of 
overvaluation.  According to this view, therefore, real exchange rate volatility will be 
strongly influenced by the market’s concept of a signal of fundamental disequilibrium. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  Section Three develops a 
simple theoretical model.  The empirics of exchange rate volatility are investigated in 
Section Four.  The concept of misalignment is discussed in Section Five, and its 
relationship to exchange rate volatility in Section Six.  Section Seven concludes. 
 
3.  A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET 
The challenge in theoretical models of the foreign exchange market is to reconcile the 
near-random-walk behaviour of exchange rates with the idea that fundamentals matter. 
There is empirical support for non-linear models which imply that fundamentals become   4
important outside a certain range (Bleaney and Mizen, 1996; Michael et al., 1997; Sollis 
et al., 2002). These empirical models do not, however, yield insights into the 
determinants of the volatility of a particular currency, since their estimated parameters 
have no economic meaning – they simply reflect the observed pattern of the data.  In this 
section, we develop the idea that volatility is determined by signals of misalignment, 
based on the model of Frankel and Froot (1986a, b). 
  In Frankel and Froot’s model, the foreign exchange market is populated by 
“fundamentalists” and “chartists”, who supply exchange-rate forecasts to portfolio 
managers.  The log of the exchange rate (foreign currency units per unit of domestic 
currrency) at time t is denoted st .  Portfolio managers are the only agents active in the 
foreign exchange market, and generate their own forecasts as a weighted average of the 
two groups of forecasters.  Chartists believe that exchange rates are non-stationary and 
use some ARIMA(p, 1, q) model to generate forecasts.  Fundamentalists believe that 
exchange rates will revert to equilibrium at some predetermined rate, but it is realistic to 
assume that they are not certain what the equilibrium is, since even estimates by 
economists have quite wide confidence intervals (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2004; Wren-
Lewis and Driver, 1998).  Suppose that fundamentalist j believes at time t that the 
equilibrium is S jt, and let the mean of these beliefs across all fundamentalists be St .
1  
The log of the exchange rate as forecast at time t by the chartists, fundamentalists and 
portfolio managers are respectively s
c
t 1 + , s
f
t 1 +  and s
m
t 1 + .  Then we have 
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1 It is at this point that the model diverges from that of Frankel and Froot (1986), who assume that S is 
known but that w varies according to the past forecasting performance of the two groups.   5
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  Equation (1) expresses portfolio managers’ forecasts as a weighted average of 
those of fundamentalists and chartists, and equation (2) represents fundamentalists’ 
average forecast as a constant rate of mean reversion to the average of their beliefs about 
the equilibrium rate. As in Frankel and Froot (1986a) and Engel and West (2005), the 
actual exchange rate is determined in a generic way consistent with a wide range of 
models, as the sum of the fundamentals (z) and a term based on the expected level of the 
exchange rate: 
  z s s t
m
t t a + =
+1         ( 3 )  
Substituting from equations (1) and (2) and rearranging yields: 
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Equation (4) says that the exchange rate is a linear combination of chartist 
forecasts, fundamentalists’ beliefs about the equilibrium and the fundamentals.   
Fundamentalists’ beliefs about the equilibrium are updated in the light of empirical data 
about the economy, and these data inevitably relate to the current exchange rate. This 
suggests that news that is interpreted as a signal of significant exchange rate 
misalignment is particularly powerful information.  Fundamentalists who were previously 
uncertain whether the exchange rate was misaligned are forced to adjust their beliefs.  For 
example, the announcement of a large current account deficit convinces more 
fundamentalists that the exchange rate is over-valued.  Through (4), this adjustment of 
fundamentalists’ beliefs exerts a pressure pulling the exchange rate back towards   6
equilibrium (St  falls).  The exchange rate can still appreciate, if the fundamentals 
improve or if chartist forecasts are more bullish, but it can only do so in the face of a stiff 
headwind in the opposite direction from fundamentalist opinion. 
 
4.  NOMINAL SHOCKS AND EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY 
In many macroeconomic models nominal shocks (i.e. shocks to monetary growth or 
relative prices) have significant exchange rate effects.  It has been repeatedly shown, 
however, that these models help little in explaining empirical exchange rate behaviour.  
In this section we examine the correlation with trade openness of the volatility of the first 
difference of (a) monetary growth, (b) home inflation relative to trade-weighted foreign 
inflation, (c) the nominal effective exchange rate (in logs), and (d) the real effective 
exchange rate based on consumer prices (in logs). Table 1 shows the results for OECD 
countries over the period from the first quarter of 1980 to the third quarter of 2005 (the 
picture is similar if we use data only up to the last quarter of 1998, before European 
Monetary Union).  Openness is not significantly correlated with the two measures of the 
volatility of nominal shocks, but it is significantly correlated with both nominal and real 
effective exchange rate volatility at the 0.01 level.  The correlations are even stronger 
with the log of openness, which reduces the importance of differences at the top end of 
the scale.  Since countries are arranged in increasing order of openness in Table 1, these 
correlations are apparent by inspection.  Table 1 also shows the standard deviation of the 
real exchange rate level, whose cross-country pattern is very similar to that of the 
standard deviation of quarterly changes.  This means that the results are robust to   7
alternative measures of volatility (short-run or long-run variation).  Note that exchange 
rate volatility is not correlated with the volatility of nominal shocks.   
 
 
Table 1.  Volatility of nominal shocks and exchange rates across countries, 1980-2005 
 
 Volatility  of: 













  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
United States  2.75  9.98  3.35  2.95  11.6  19.3 
Japan  3.37  10.11  4.49  4.50  18.7  21.2 
Australia  3.85  5.38  4.09  3.93  12.7  34.9 
Spain  2.81  7.42  2.00  2.08  8.4  37.5 
Italy  2.58  6.46  2.22  2.23  7.6  40.1 
France  8.74  5.06  1.58  1.44  4.1  47.6 
Finland  29.37  9.03  2.25  2.29  9.8  48.1 
Canada  4.38  10.4  2.01  2.30  11.0  50.8 
United Kingdom  4.56  6.46  3.16  3.30  9.7  51.3 
New Zealand  6.43  7.49  3.68  3.69  9.3  54.3 
Germany  3.37  12.77  1.70  1.82  5.3  55.0 
Sweden  2.52  9.96  2.86  2.95  9.9  61.4 
Iceland  7.60  12.55  3.13  2.70  6.7  67.2 
Denmark  5.02  6.84  1.50  1.47  5.7  70.0 
Norway  6.02  6.58  1.81  1.82  3.8  74.5 
Austria  2.95  7.48  1.05  0.99  5.3  79.1 
Switzerland  5.11  6.75  2.26  2.17  6.6  85.6 
Netherlands  2.69  6.99  1.54  1.42  3.8  109.0 
Ireland  12.19  10.64  2.10  2.06  5.3  110.8 
Belgium  4.04  5.58  1.55  1.37  4.6  141.2 
            
Correlation with 
openness 











change in ln (NEER) 
−0.063  0.183  1  0.984∗∗∗  0.833∗∗∗  −0.636∗∗ 
 Notes.  Columns (1) – (5) are standard deviations, using quarterly observations from 1980q1 to 2005q3, of: 
(1) change in annualised percentage money growth; (2) second difference in trade-weighted log relative 
prices (the ratio of the real to the nominal effective exchange rate index), times 1000; (3) change in log 
nominal effective exchange rate, times 100; (4) change in CPI-based log real effective exchange rate, times 
100; (5) level of log real effective exchange rate, times 100 (source: IFS).  Column (6) is exports plus 
imports as a percentage of GDP in 1990 (source: WDI).  Iceland figures are based on 1986-2005 only, 
because of high inflation in 1980-5. *,**,*** denote significant at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels 
respectively.   8
  Table 2 shows that there is a significant element of truth to the idea that relative 
prices adjust to offset nominal exchange rate movements in more open economies.  The 
table shows a regression for home inflation relative to trade-weighted foreign inflation by 
country over the period 1980q1 to 2005q3.  As expected, in almost all countries relative 
inflation rates fall when the nominal exchange rate appreciates, after allowing for 
persistence in relative inflation rates (as in Table 1, the countries are ordered by 
openness).  Moreover the effect tends to be larger in the more open economies towards 
the foot of the table, although the United States stands out as a significant exception to 
this.  Table 3 shows the effect of estimating the same regression for all twenty countries 
as a panel, and (in column (2)) allowing the coefficients to vary with openness.  The 
impact of openness on the response of relative inflation rates to exchange rate movements 
is statistically significant.  Nevertheless the effect is small, and an extra 100 per cent in 
the ratio of trade to GDP appears to increase the exchange-rate elasticity of relative 
inflation rates by only six percentage points.  This is clearly insufficient to explain why 
relatively closed economies like Australia, Japan and the United States have more than 
twice as high a standard deviation of real effective exchange rate movements as the most 
open economies.   9
Table 2.  Adjustment of relative inflation rates to nominal exchange rates, 1980-2005 
  Dependent variable: change in log trade-weighted 
relative prices (home divided by foreign) 
Country  Coefficient of lagged 
change in relative prices 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient of change in 
log nominal effective 
exchange rate (t-stat.) 
  (1) (2) 
United States  0.005 (0.06)  −0.137 (−7.48) 
Japan  0.248 (2.45)  −0.016 (−0.90) 
Australia  0.766 (12.76)  −0.038 (−3.08) 
Spain  0.397 (4.29)  −0.030 (−0.93) 
Italy  0.645 (8.36)  −0.021 (−0.78) 
France  0.395 (4.20)  −0.082 (−2.74) 
Finland  0.065 (0.64)  −0.031 (−1.03) 
Canada  0.292 (2.99)  0.039 (0.91) 
United Kingdom  0.391 (4.27)  0.015 (0.91) 
New Zealand  0.774 (12.18)  −0.042 (−2.22) 
Germany  0.203 (2.04)  −0.119 (−2.05) 
Sweden  0.231 (2.28)  −0.028 (−0.21) 
Iceland  0.653 (8.90)  −0.119 (−2.60) 
Denmark  0.180 (1.82)  −0.084 (−2.40) 
Norway  0.446 (4.87)  −0.050 (−1.59) 
Austria  −0.028 (−0.28)  −0.192 (−3.76) 
Switzerland  0.206 (2.21)  −0.066 (−2.93) 
Netherlands  0.330 (3.63)  −0.133 (−3.56) 
Ireland  0.501 (6.11)  −0.122 (−2.82) 
Belgium  0.148 (1.72)  −0.143 (−5.66) 
 Notes.  The table shows the coefficients from a regression of ∆ln(RP) on lagged ∆ln(RP) and ∆ln(NEER), 
by country, using quarterly data 1980q1 to 2005q3 (1986q1 to 2005q3 for Iceland). NEER – nominal 
effective exchange rate; RP – home prices divided by trade-weighted foreign prices, derived as the ratio of 
the real to the nominal exchange rate index.   10
Table 3.  Panel regression of relative inflation on nominal exchange rates 
 
  Dependent variable:  ∆ln(RP) 
 (1)  (2) 












Openness ratio    −0.00037 
(−0.70) 
Openness*Lagged ∆ln(RP)    −0.0261 
(−0.37) 
Openness*∆ln(NEER)    −0.065∗∗ 
(−2.67) 
    
Sample size  1958  1958 
R-squared  0.336  0.339 
Standard error  0.0072  0.0072 




5.  SIGNALS OF DISEQUILIBRIUM IN THE EXCHANGE MARKET 
The analysis in Section Three suggests that the economics profession’s understanding of 
what constitutes exchange rate misalignment, by informing fundamentalists’ assessments, 
will strongly influence the observed volatility of exchange rates.  This is an important 
aspect of the argument – because fundamentalists rely on economic analysis, the 
assessments of the economics profession matter. 
What then are the economics profession’s criteria for assessing misalignment? 
Recent discussion of the large deficits of the United States demonstrates that it comes 
down to the sustainability of current account balances – an exchange rate is not 
misaligned if the current account balance is sustainable (Bergsten and Williamson, 2004; 
Cline, 2005; Mann, 1999).  Advanced countries are not likely to face the same credit   11
constraints as developing countries in financing current account deficits.  The only 
question then is whether the indefinite continuation of a given current account balance 
would conflict with the principles of portfolio diversification, because of the implied 
accumulation of foreign assets on one side or the other.  If N is the net asset position of 
the country, CA is the current account balance (c as a ratio to GDP), and Y is GDP, which 






=          ( 5 )  
At this equilibrium, the growth rate of N is just equal to that of Y.  If N/Y gets very large 
in absolute value, investors may require higher expected returns on foreign assets, 
implying currency movements that reduce current account imbalances.  Mussa (2004) 
suggests that for the United States N/Y cannot go lower than –1, so that if g is 5 per cent 
p.a., the sustainable current account deficit cannot exceed 5 per cent (Cline (2005) 
provides further discussion of these issues). 
  For present purposes, the issue is not the limits to N/Y, but why GDP is 
universally treated as the appropriate scale factor.  The answer is that, from the point of 
view of portfolio allocation, it is the best measure of a country’s weight in world 
production.  There is no reason why a country should form a lower proportion of an ideal 
world portfolio just because, for example, its trade/GDP ratio is low.  So long as the 
liquidity of the currency is not in question, its foreign exchange earnings are not relevant.  
To summarise: sustainability analysis suggests that the ratio of the current account 
balance to GDP, rather than to its trade flows, should be treated as the principal signal of 
misalignment. 
   12
6.  THE EMPIRICS OF TRADE FLOW ADJUSTMENT 
The final element in the argument is that the elasticity of trade flows with respect to the 
real exchange rate is similar across countries.  If that is the case, then more open 
economies will experience larger fluctuations in their current account balance, as a ratio 
of GDP, for given real exchange rate volatility.  If, as argued above, it is the ratio of the 
current account balance to GDP that sets the limit to real exchange rate volatility, then 
those limits will be narrower for more open economies. 
Evidence on this point is presented in Table 4.  Table 4 presents the results of 
regressing the change in the trade surplus as a proportion of total trade on the change in 
the log terms of trade and current and lagged changes in the log real effective exchange 
rate, for a panel of 22 OECD countries over the period 1975-2004.  In the second column, 
the exchange rate coefficients are allowed to vary with openness.  They are similar in 
sign but approximately equal in absolute magnitude, which suggests that openness 
accelerates the effect of real exchange rate movements on trade flows, but does not 
increase it in the long run.  In the third and fourth columns, the exercise is repeated for 
the current account balance as a proportion of total trade, with very similar results. 
Since the real exchange rate elasticities of trade flows as a proportion of total 
trade are not obviously smaller for more open economies, the implication is that real 
exchange rate fluctuations will have larger effects on their current account balances as a 
proportion of GDP, and therefore on the assessment of sustainability. 
   13
 
Table 4.  Trade Balances, Current Account Balances and Real Exchange Rates 
 
  Change in trade balance/total 
trade 
Change in current account 
balance/total trade 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Change in ln 





























Openness    0.00331 
(0.90) 
  0.00186 
(0.44) 
Openness*Change 
in ln REER 
  −0.164 
(−2.05) 
  −0.189 
(−2.09) 
Openness*Lagged 
change in ln REER 
 0 . 2 0 6  
(2.85) 
 0 . 2 0 2  
(2.50) 
        
Sample size  576  576  570  570 
R-squared  0.162  0.178  0.176  0.189 
Standard error  0.0266  0.0264  0.0297  0.0295 
Notes.  Estimated as a panel of annual data for 22 OECD countries, 1975-2004. REER – real effective 




It has been argued here that the correlation of real exchange rate volatility with trade 
openness is evidence that fundamentals matter in determining the range over which 
exchange rates fluctuate.  The adjustment of domestic prices to exchange rate movements 
can only explain a small proportion of the phenomenon, and consequently the cross-
country pattern of nominal exchange rate volatility is strikingly similar to that for real 
exchange rate volatility, and not related to shocks to nominal variables such as monetary 
growth or relative inflation rates.  Theoretical models suggest that exchange rates are   14
likely to struggle to reach values where 100 per cent of fundamentalist opinion believes 
them to be over- or under-valued, because of the resulting pressure to revert towards 
equilibrium.  For the economics profession (and implicitly therefore for fundamentalist 
opinion in the market), misalignments tend to be judged by the sustainability of current 
account positions.  Since sustainability is defined in terms of the implied long-run net 
asset position as a ratio of GDP, it is the current account balance as a ratio of GDP rather 
than as a ratio of total trade flows that is taken as a signal of misalignment. More open 
economies have higher ratios of trade flows to GDP, so their current account/GDP ratios 
react more strongly to real exchange rate movements.  Consequently, their real effective 
exchange rates fluctuate within a narrower range. 
  More broadly, this paper may be regarded as resurrecting the importance of 
fundamentals in the determination of exchange rates.  Fundamentals may not explain why 
the real exchange rate is at a certain level at a certain date, but they can explain why it is 
rarely observed outside a certain range.  Economists have long suspected this to be the 
case, but have had difficulty in identifying evidence to support this hypothesis. 
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